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THE TEN MOST IMPORTANT CASES UNDER THE
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, LIABILITY ACT*

WILLIAM H. DEPARCQ**

In the 57 years the Federal Employers' Liability Act 1 has
been on the books, the Supreme Court of the United States has
written more than 200 opinions explaining what the Act means and
how it is to be applied. Many of those opinions may now safely
be left to gather dust on a library shelf, because Congress, in
1939, amended the statute to clear away some of the subtle distinctions the Court had drawn in order to limit coverage under
the old Act, and because the Court itself in recent years has had
a very different attitude toward FELA than it did in an earlier
day. Nevertheless the Court has had more than 60 FELA cases
since the 1939 amendments 2 took effect, and that Court's own
attitude changed, and it is difficult - and dangerous - to choose
among these and to say that any ten cases are the ten most
important. But this is the task which I have undertaken and
I present my list of ten with no confidence that these are the
ten most important but with some hope that they do illustrate
the more important aspects of the special body of law which has
grown up about FELA.
My first case, Herdman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 is a case
which the railroad won. It is the only case on the list in which
that happened, and one of the very few cases in the Supreme
Court in the last 25 years in which that was true. Herdman fell
in a zaboose when the engineer made an emergency stop in order
to avoid hitting a car filled with school children which was on
the track. The stop was not unusually severe, and Herdman him* Taken from remarks made at the annual convention of the American Trial Lawyers
Association In 1966.
** L.L.B. 1930, St. Paul College of Law; De Parcq and Anderson, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (1954), 35 Stat. 65 (1908), formerly 34 Stat. 232 (1906)
[hereinafter referred to as the FELA].
2. 45 U.S.C.A. §1 51, 54, 56, & 60 (1954), 53 Stat. 1404 (1939).
8. 352 U.. 518 (1957).
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self testified that such stops were not unusual or extraordinary.
On this showing, the Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict
for the- defendant. The importance of the case is that it shows
that the basis for recovery under FELA continues to be, as the
Act states, negligence. It has been much said in recent years,
by railroad lawyers and by dissenting justices, that a majority
of the Court has imposed absolute liability on the railroads. Herdman demonstrates that this is not true, and that the railroad is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if there has been no
showing that it was negligent. Two more recent Supreme Court
cases demonstrate the same proposition and there is convincing
evidence to the same effect from the trial courts. In federal courts
defendants have won final judgments in about the same proportion
of contested FELA cases as in other negligence actions heard there.
It is true, as the Supreme Court said in the Rogers 4 case,
which I shall discuss in a moment, that there are "special features
.if this statutory negligence action that make it significantly different from the ordinary common-law negligence action. '"
It is
because of these special features that the lawyer who is experienced in ordinary negligence litigation may find himself lost when he
takes his first FELA case. But though the action is based on
statute rathern than common law, it is, as Herdman proves, a
negligence action.
For whose negligence is the railroad responsible? The statute
speaks of the fault of "any of the officers, agents, or employees"
of the railraod. The meaning given this phrase is illustrated by
my second case,. i
.
. Missouri Pacific R.. Co.
A Missouri
Pacific employee was injured through negligence in switching the
car in which he was riding. The car was being switched by the
Houston Belt Railway, a separate terminal railroad which does all
the switching in that area. Under common law principles there
was a good argument that the Belt Railway was an independent
contractor, rather than an agent, but the Court said that "we need
not depend upon common-law principles of liability" s and that
"an accomodating scope must be given to the word 'agents' '"
to carry out the intent of Congress in the statute. Since the Belt
Railway was "engaged in furthering the operational activities" of
the Missouri Pacific, it, and its employees, were "agents" of the
Missouri Pacific for purposes of the statute.
4. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957)
Rogers].
5. Id. at 509, 510.
6. 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (1954).
7. 356 U.S. 326 (1958).
8. Id. at 329.
9. Id. at 330, 331.

[hereinafter referred to as
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The FELA is an exercise of the power of Congress over interstate commerce, and for years there was difficulty in knowing
whether an injured employee's relation to such commerce was
close enough to bring him within the protection of the Act. For 30
years the Court was very restrictive, and required that the employee
be engaged in interstate commerce at the moment of injury. In
1939 Congress amended the Act to liberalize its coverage, but there
remained uncertainty as to how far it had gone. That uncertainty
was resolved in 1956 in Reed v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 10 The employee there was a file clerk at the railroad's home office, injured
when a cracked window pane blew in on her. The Court found
that under the 1939 amendment she was within FELA, since the
test "is not whether the employee is engaged in transportation,
but rather whether what he does in any way furthers or substantially affects transportation." 1 1 Since the railroad could not transport things without efficient files of the sort this clerk maintained,
she met the test. The Court rejected the argument that FELA
applies only to those exposed to the special hazards of the railroad industry. In a colorful phrase it said: "The benefits of the
Act are not limited to those who have cinders in their hair, soot
on their faces, or callouses on their hands.' ' 1 2 One excellent lawyer
for the Pennsylvania was going off to a panel discussion about
FELA shortly after the Reed decision came down, and he asked
a top officer of the raiload if it had any employees whose work
did not further interstate commerce, within the meaning of the
Reed case. "Yes, ' the answer came back, "our lawyers." That
seems to be about right. In the light of Reed, every railroad
employee, except perhaps its lawyers, should be held covered by
the Act.
The next case, Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co.," 3 is
important because it suggests the kind of proof of negligence
which is sufficient to take a case to the jury. Jesionowski was
injured when a train derailed, and submitted the case to the jury
on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The jury found for him, but an
appellate court set the verdict aside. The derailment could have
occurred either because the train or the track were defective, or
because Jesionowski had himself thrown a switch improperly.
Thus, the appellate court reasoned, the instrumentalities involved
were not under the exclusive control of the railroad and res ipsa
was inapplicable. The Supreme Court disagreed. It rejected any
attempt to apply rigid judicial definitions of res ipsa. Instead, it
10, 351 U.S. 502 (1956).
11. Id. at 505.
12. Id. at 506.
13. 329 U.S. 452 (1947).
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said, the question is simply whether the circumstances were such
as to justify a finding that this derailment was the result of the
defendant's negligence. "Derailments are extraordinary, not usual
happenings. When they do occur, a jury may fairly find that they
occurred as a result of negligence."" The jury, by its verdict,
had necessarily rejected the railroad's theory that Jesionowski had
thrown the switch improperly. Accordingly the derailment must
have been caused by some defect in the train or the track, and
the jury was entitled to find, without further proof, that the railroad was negligent in permitting such a defect.
The lawyer who is aware of Jesionowski should never let the
Latin words, res ipsa loquitur, escape his lips. Instead he should
argue only that the circumstances are such that an inference of
negligence is permissible. I learned this the hard way, when I
sued for the death of a brakeman who was killed in a head-on
collision of two trains on a single track. As the famous line,
"this is a hell of a way to run a railroad," suggests, the mere
occurrence of such a collision argues strongly that there was negligence. But when I made the mistake of submitting this as a
res ipsa case, and the jury inexplicably returned a verdict for
defendant, I had to overcome a great many cases which have
said that a directed verdict is never proper in a res ipsa case
before I was able to get the verdict set aside, and judgment ordered
for plaintiff as to liability. If I had submitted the case on the
theory that such a collision is circumstantial evidence which compels an inference of negligence, my task would have been much
easier.
If one single decision, of the more than 200 the Supreme Court
has handed down under FELA, can be called the most important,
it would have to be my fifth case, Rogers v. Missouri Pacific
R. Co.' 5 Section One of the Act has always provided that the
railroad is liable if injury or death is caused "in whole or in
part"16 by the negligence of its officers, agents, or employees.
For years the courts, unwilling to believe that a mere statute could
mar the symmetry of the common law, refused to take the statute
seriously. Instead they smuggled back into the statute the common
law notion of "proximate cause." They talked such nonsense as
that the negligence of the employer may have been a cause in
part in a philosophical sense but not in a legal sense. The Supreme
Court, in more recent years, had sought to curb such tendencies,
and had warned that "the introduction of dialectical subtleties can
serve no useful purpose," but many courts still failed to learn
14.
15.
16.

Id at 458.
Supra, note 4.
Supra, note 6.
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this lesson. Accordingly, when Rogers was injured in an accident
which resulted both from the railroad's negligence in requiring him
to work in a dangerous place and from his own inattentiveness,
the Missouri Supreme Court set his verdict aside. 17 It said that
in order to recover the plaintiff must show that his injury would
not have occurred but for the negligence of his employer. This
is, of course, the language of proximate causation, not of a statute
which imposes liability for injuries resulting "in part" from employer negligence. The Supreme Court reversed, and put to rest,
one hopes for good, the notion that proximate cause has any application in FELA. It said: "Under this statute the test of a jury
case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion
that employer negligence played any party, even the slightest, in
18
producing the injury or death for which damages are sought."'
But while Rogers is important for settling the causation muddle,-it is even more significant in defining the sufficiency of the
evidence to go to the jury. For years lower courts had been setting
verdicts aside if the evidence suggested more than one explanation
of the accident, and only by speculation and conjecture could the
jury decide whether the accident was the result of employer negligence or of some other cause. This, the Supreme Court said in
Rogers, is not proper. The Court said:
It does not matter that, from the evidence, the jury may also
with reason, on grounds of probability, attribute the result
to other causes, including the employee's contributory negligence. . . . (T)he Congress vested the power of decision in
these actions exclusively in the jury in all but the infrequent
cases where fair-minded jurors cannot honestly differ whether
fault of the employer played any part in the employee's
injury.' 9
The infrequent cases do occur, in which there is no issue for the
jury. My first case, the Herdman case, where the Supreme Court
agreed that defendant was entitled to a verdict as a matter of
law, was such a case. It was decided the same day as Rogers.
But such cases are infrequent. In a series of some 20 cases in
the four years after Rogers, the Supreme Court showed that it
meant what it had said there by per curiam reversal of lower
court decisions which had taken cases from the jury.
It was not only with regard to causation that the courts for
a long period refused to believe that Congress meant what it said.
17.
18.
19.

Rogers v. Thompson, 284 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1955).
Rogers, aupra note 4, at 506 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 506, 510.
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The original Act abolished contributory negligence as a complete
defense, and substituted instead a rule of comparative negligence.
The courts were equal to this. They took the notion of assumption
of risk out of the obscurity to which it had been rightfully consigned, and found that plaintiff had been guilty of assumption of
risk, and thus could recover nothing, under circumstances which
would otherwise suggest contributory negligence. This was one of
the things which concerned Congress in 1939, and it then amended
Section Four of the Act by abolishing the defense of assumption of
2
risk.2 0 But the decision in Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 1
was needed to give meaning to the amendment. A railroad policeman was killed while working in a dark yard with narrow clearance
and no warning from backing trains. The Court of Appeals said
there could be no recovery for his death because the nature of
his job required him to work in such places and thus he had
assumed the risk. The '"39 amendment, according to the. Court of
Appeals.2 2 had abolished assumption of risk as a defense against
the consequence of the employer's negligence, but had not abolished
it as negating any conclusion that negligence existed at all. The
Supreme Court disagreed. It held that "every vestige of the doctrine of assumption of risk was obliterated from the law by the
1939 amendment" 23 and said it "must not, contrary to the will of
Congress, be allowed recrudesence under any other label in the
common law lexicon."24 Accordingly a railroad must now exercise due care to protect its employees even against accustomed
dangers.
There are some cases in which proof of negligence is not required at all. The plaintiff in Myers v. Reading Co.", was injured because a brake wheel was stiff and kicked back, causing
him to lose his hold and fall. He could not point to any defect
in the brake, except. that on this occasion it had failed to function
properly. But a statute known as the Safety Appliance Act requires
cars to be equipped with "efficient hand brakes." This is one
of many requirements imposed by that statute, and by the Boiler
Inspection Act. 21 Cars, for example, must have couplers which
couple automatically. If cars fail to couple, the railroad is liable
20.
21.
(1945).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Supra, note 2.
318 U.S. 54 (1943). A second appeal was prosecuted and reported at 323 U.S. 574
128 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1942).
318 U.S. at 58
Id. at 67.
Myers v. Reading Co., 331 U.S. 477 (1947).
45 U.S.C.A. § 11 (1954), 86 Stat. 298 (1910).
45 U.S.C.A. § 22-34 (1954).
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no matter how careful it has been. Where there is a claim under
one of these special statutes, "the statutory liability is not based
upon the carrier's negligence. The duty imposed is an absolute
one and the carrier is not excused by any showing of care however assiduous." Thus it is highly advantageous to the plaintiff
if he can bring his case within one of these statutes. Not only
is he then freed of the burden of proving negligence, but also
contributory negligence is not even a partial defense where these
acts apply.
The case

of Lilly v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. 28 was

a

suit under the Boiler Inspection Act. Plaintiff had slipped on ice
on the tender, and alleged that there was a leak in the tender,
which would have been a violation of that statute. In closing argument plaintiff's lawyer said, fervently if ungrammatically: "gentlemen, don't find there was. no leak, or you put him out of court. ' 29
The jury returned a general verdict for plaintiff, but in answer
to a special interrogatory specificallly found that there had been
no lelak. I was called in to argue the, case before the Supreme
Court, in an effort to resuscitate the verdict for plaintiff. The
theory successfully advanced there was that ice on the tender,
even without a leak, is a violation of an Interstate Commerce
Commission rule prohibiting any foreign matter on the top of a
tender. ICC rules made under the Boiler Inspection Act have the
same force as do the provisions of the Act itself, and there is
absolute liability for violation of one of them. In this case the
ICC rule had never been called to the attention of the trial court,
or relied on in any way below, but this did not matter since the
court should have taken judicial notice of it. And what to do about
that unfortunate remark in the closing argument? Justice Murphy,
speaking for the Court, was equal to the task. He said: "There
is no reason to penalize petitioner for remarks of counsel uttered
in an excess of zeal." ' 30

The case is important in defining the

weight to be given ICC regulations, and in establishing that judicial notice must be taken of them, but it is most important, I
submit, in showing that the Court will protect the FELA plaintiff
even against the blunders of his own lawyer.
Section Six of the FELA gives plaintiffs a very wide choice
of forums in which to sue. The choice has been cut down somewhat in recent years, by decisions holding that the federal transfer of venue statute and state doctrines of forum non conveniens
may be applied to FELA cases, but it is still an advantage to the
28.
29.
30.

317 U.S. 481
Id. at 489.
Id.

(1943).
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plaintiff, where he can, to bring suit in a community accustomed
to large verdicts and sympathetic to working men. By the same
token, the railroads have sought in every way possible to prevent such a choice by plaintiffs. One such device was involved
in Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co. 31 There the railroad
advanced funds to its injured employee, so that he might not be
penniless while settlement of his claim was discussed. This was
a generous and humanitarian act by the railroad. But in the
receipts which the employee signed for such loans, there was a
provision that if the negotiations failed, and he brought suit, he
would sue only in the county or district where he resided or where
the injuries were sustained, and not elsewhere. The ungrateful
employee did not sue in Michigan, where he lived and and the
accident had occurred, but filed suit instead in Illinois. The railroad then sued in Michigan to enjoin him from prosecuting his
Illinois suit, on the ground that it violated the loan agreement.
The Supreme Court held the railroad could not obstruct the Illinois suit. Section Five of the Act prohibits any contract or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable
any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created
by the Act. The venue options of Section Six were, the Court said,
"a right of sufficient substantiality ' 3 2- to be protected by Section
Five, and accordingly the attempt to limit the choice of venue by
contract was void. Any other result, it was reasoned, would obstruct "the right of the Liability Act plaintiff to secure the maximum recovery if he should elect judicial trial of his cause."'3 8
It is not only the railroads which seek to limit the rights
given employees by FELA. Some state courts have been unsympathetic to the Act, particularly in view of the broad construction
the Supreme Court has put upon it in recent years. If a state
court takes a grudging or hostile attitude toward the Act, it can
and probably will be reversed by the Supreme Court, as Rogers
and the per curiam cases which have followed it show. A different kind of barrier toward enforcement of the employee's rights
is sometimes found in state procedural rules. The accepted test
is that a state court must follow federal decisions on matters of
substance, but that it is free to apply to an FELA case the same
procedures it applies to all other cases. "Substance" and "procedure" are inexact terms in many areas of the law, and this is
no less true where FELA is concerned. The best illustration of this
31.
32.
33.

338 U.S. 263 (1949).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 266.
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15

is Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama.34 The state courts in Georgia
at the time of that decision followed old-fashioned procedural
notions, among which was the doctrine that a pleading is to be
construed most strictly against the pleader. Thus the Georgia
court sustained a demurrer to a complaint which, strictly construed, alleged no more than that plaintiff was injured when he
stepped on a large clinker lying alongside the track in the railroad yards. The court read the complaint as if it had said that
plaintiff's vision was unobstructed and that he could have seen
and avoided the clinker, and it thought also that there was no
allegation that the railroad was negligent in allowing the clinker
to be there. On a sympathetic reading of the complaint, it would
have been clear that plaintiff was alleging negligence by the railroad, and that his vision was obstructed, but it was not then
fashionable in Georgia to' read complaints sympathetically., The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the right of trial given railroad employees by Congress "cannot be defeated by the forms
of local practice, '3 5 and that "strict local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery
authorized by federal laws. ' 36 The case appears to stand for the
proposition that no state rule, whether it be called "substance" or
"procedure," can be applied in an FELA case if it will make it
more difficult for the plaintiff to recover.
Plaintiffs can and do lose FELA cases. The statute has not
made an insurer out oi the railroad. But as the ten decisions I
have discussed show, the Supreme Court has made it as easy as
possible for the employee with a meritorious claim to obtain the
relief which Congress has said is due him

84.

35.
36.

338 U.S. 294 (1949).
Id. at 296.
Id. at 298.

